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Introduction
Optimism is known to play an important role in human
experience leading to more happiness, greater achievements and
better health [1], although inappropriate optimism can also lead to
poor choices [2]. Low optimism is also closely associated with
depression and anxiety [3]. Because of this, there has been a recent
surge of research interest so as to unveil the underlying
mechanisms of optimism, its neural substrate and behavioral
consequences [4].
Trait optimism is generally measured using questionnaires, the
most common of which is the Life Orientation Test-Revised
(LOT-R) [5]. The LOT-R is a series of six statements (and an
additional four filler items) with four positively and four negatively
worded items (e.g. ‘‘In uncertain times, I usually expect the best’’
and ‘‘If something can go wrong for me, it will’’) which subjects
have to score from 0 to 4 according to how much they agree with
it.
Optimism is thought to affect cognitive processes in at least two
ways. First, it biases one’s expectations in a positive direction:
while optimists view the glass as being half-full, pessimists might
perceive it as half-empty. Formally, such a divergence in the
interpretation of the same object could result from the influence of
different prior beliefs. Second, optimism also appears to impact
learning: optimists sometimes maintain positive beliefs in defiance
of what should be strong evidence, such as doctors underestimat-
ing the risks of treatments or people continuing to buy lottery
tickets. Recent work has shown that this may be due to biases
towards more readily learning from ‘‘good news’’ (i.e. outcomes
that are better than expected) than from ‘‘bad news’’ [6–9]. This
biased learning could serve as a way to maintain the biases on the
beliefs themselves. However, it is not known whether this impact of
optimism on learning generalizes to all settings or is only restricted
to the domain of personally relevant information and self-beliefs.
More generally, how optimism relates to measurable cognitive
biases is still poorly understood.
To approach these questions, we designed a behavioral task in
which positive beliefs about future outcomes as well as learning
biases could be quantified in individuals, independently from
LOT-R scores and subjective introspection. This paradigm
allowed us to disambiguate whether trait optimism functions as
a prior belief on the likelihood of future outcomes, as a learning
bias, or both.
Results
Fifty-one subjects took part in the main study (30 males and
21 females, age range: 17–45 years old). They were first asked
to answer a set of questionnaires assessing trait optimism and
related personality traits: the LOT-R as a measure of
trait optimism [10], the Barratt Impulsiveness scale [11],
NEO five-factor inventory [12], Digit Span AB task [13]
and MINI International Neuropsychiatric Interview question-
naire [14].
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The subjects then performed the behavioral task. Each trial
started with the presentation of one of many fractal conditioned
stimuli (CS). This was followed by a binary outcome (reward,
depicted as a full treasure chest or no reward, empty chest) with a
probability ci drawn uniformly between 0 and 1, that was fixed for
each fractal CS but unknown to the subjects (Figure 1a, see
Methods). Each CS was presented only a few times (four times on
average) and presentations were interleaved. After a fractal CS
had reached its allotted number of presentations, subjects were
asked to choose between the fractal CS and a colored square to
maximize their chance of getting a reward. They were instructed
that the reward probability of fractal CSs was constant and as
experienced so far. The reward probability of the colored square
was indicated explicitly by the dots underneath it. Subjects were
not given feedback about their instrumental choices but told that
the outcomes would determine their final score.
Because subjects were given very little information about the
true CS reward probability, we expected their reward expectations
for fractal CSs (but not for the colored squares) to reflect both the
information they had been exposed to, and subjects’ prior beliefs
about the probability of rewards. By varying the number of
presentations before the instrumental choice point, we could probe
the learning process at various time points. We asked three
questions: i) Does trait optimism relate to a prior belief about the
probability of reward ci associated with each fractal stimulus? ii)
Does this influence fade with increasing experience, as it should if
optimism works as a prior belief, or is maintained or even
amplified, as it should if optimism affects learning? iii) Are the
effects about prior beliefs valence specific i.e. do they correspond
only to an overestimation of the likelihood of positive events or also
to an underestimation of the likelihood of aversive events?
Optimistic participants (i.e. with LOT-R.mean LOT-R) were
biased towards overestimating the probability that rewards would
follow fractal CSs (Fig. 1b).
To ascertain whether this bias was due to a prior belief related
to optimism, we modeled the task as an optimal Bayesian inference
process. Subjects were assumed to optimally combine the binary
evidence p(Di|ci) regarding the probability of the observations Di
(number of rewards observed over trials) given some probability of
reward for that fractal ci, with their prior expectations p(ci) that a
reward would be given (see Methods). The shape of the prior (Beta
distribution) was controlled by 2 parameters: a and b, with the
prior mean being a=(azb): Choices were modeled as involving
the comparison of the reward probability associated with the
square with the estimated mean of the posterior distribution
p(ci|Di), which describes the subjective belief about a reward being
associated with each fractal. The variability in the decision process
was parameterized by a softmax temperature parameter c.
These parameters were estimated for each subject based on their
performances at the task, using Maximum Likelihood.
Each participant was thus described by 3 free parameters: a, b
and c.
Table 1 shows the correlations between personality traits as
measured by the different questionnaires and the parameters
extracted from the behavioral task (mean of the prior: a/(a+b) and
c). Interestingly, across all participants, the average prior mean
was slightly (but statistically significantly) lower than 0.5, i.e.
slightly pessimistic according to this measure. However, when
participants were divided into two groups, ‘‘optimists’’ or
‘‘pessimists’’ based on whether their LOT-R scores were higher
or lower than the average LOT-R score for the experiment, we
found that the mean of the prior differed significantly between the
two groups, with optimists having a higher prior mean than
pessimists. More generally, the mean of the prior correlated
significantly with the LOT-R score (Figure 1c) and not with any
other personality trait. This correlation remained significant after
Bonferroni correction for 42 comparisons (p = 0.042). Thus, in this
task, subjects’ a priori beliefs about reward probabilities were
selectively and parametrically related to their LOT-R optimism
score.
To ascertain more directly whether optimism might also relate
to the learning process, we fitted reinforcement learning models to
the behavior. These models describe the learning process explicitly
by assuming that subjects maintain an estimate of the value V of
each fractal ci, and update this iteratively by adding the prediction
error – the difference between the assumed value and the observed
outcome [16]. The models had an initial value V0 which plays a
role similar to the prior mean belief a=(azb) in the Bayesian
model. In addition, the models allowed for selective learning biases
by having two learning rates: e+ for better than expected and e{
for worse than expected outcomes. These models gave a less
parsimonious account of the data than the Bayesian model (worse
BIC values– see Methods) and LOT-R scores correlated with the
initial value V0 (p = 0.002, r = 0.541 in Model RLb), but not with
either of the learning rates e+ or e2 or the difference between them
(all p.0.1). Moreover, models that did not allow for subject-
specific V0 did not capture performance differences between
optimists and pessimists. Thus, optimism is well described in terms
of a positive prior belief on the likelihood of reward, and does not
appear to affect the learning process.
Control experiment: Reducing the uncertainty
If optimism really functions like a prior, then its influence should
fade the more subjects are given evidence about the association of
stimuli and reward. If the amount of evidence is sufficiently large
then subjects’ performance should become independent of their
prior biases. For our Bayesian analysis, this means that the simplest
model that would describe their performance is one with a non-
informative prior. On the contrary, if optimism affects learning,
the difference between optimists and pessimists should be
maintained or even amplified with experience. We conducted a
control experiment aimed at testing this directly. This experiment
also excluded a potential confound in the previous experiment,
namely that optimistic subjects might have an a priori preference
for fractals. The second experiment was identical to the first one,
except for two changes in experimental parameters, designed to
reduce the level of uncertainty in the task:
Author Summary
The optimism bias is regarded as one of the most
prevalent and robust cognitive biases documented in
psychology and behavioral economics. In individuals, trait
optimism is usually measured using self-report question-
naires. However, choices in simple behavioral tasks can
also be used to infer how optimistic people are in practice.
We asked human subjects to fill in questionnaires about
trait optimism, then to participate in a behavioral
experiment where they needed to infer the likelihood of
visual targets to be associated with a reward. Using
modeling, we could then quantify the link between self-
report trait optimism and decision or learning biases. We
find that people who report that they are optimistic have a
positive a priori bias on the likelihood of future reward,
whose influence reduces with experience. In our task, trait
optimism doesn’t distort how new information is integrat-
ed: subjects update their estimates similarly following
information that is better or worse than expected.
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(i) The average number of times a given fractal was shown
before a decision was requested was increased from 4 to 10;
(ii) Instead of being interleaved, the fractals were now presented
in blocks.
A total of 51 new participants (28 males and 23 females, age
range: 17–46 years old) participated in this version of the
experiment. One subject (male) was post-hoc excluded from
further analysis, because he did not achieve a 50% performance.
In line with our hypothesis, we found that under those conditions,
the difference of performance between optimistic and pessimistic
subjects disappeared (Figure 2).
No correlation was found between the LOT-R score of
individual subjects and the mean of their prior (r = 0.009,
p = 0.95; a correlation significantly different from that of
experiment 1: Fisher’s Z= 2.26, p= 0.02; achieved power: 12
b=0.87 assuming the effect size is the same as in experiment 1).
The shape of the individual priors extracted from the subjects’
performance was always close to a non-informative (i.e. Jeffrey’s)
prior (a= b=0.5). In fact, in this control experiment, contrary to
the main experiment, model comparison (BIC) shows that the
performance of every single subject was better described by the
simpler model in which the prior is chosen to be fixed and
non-informative rather than by a prior with flexible a and b (vs.
45% of the subjects for experiment 1). This suggests that, in this
case, subjects were able to correctly take into account the evidence
and override their prior expectations: they now behave in
a way indistinguishable from that of having unbiased prior
beliefs.
Furthermore, the reinforcement learning models again failed to
account for the data better than the Bayesian models, while
supporting similar conclusions: the LOT-R score correlated
neither with the learning rates ez or e{ nor with the initial value
V0 (all p.0.1). Table 2 and 3 present the group averages of the
best-fitting parameters for all the models.
In view of these results and so as to test whether the dependency
of the bias with level of uncertainty could also be observed in the
same group of participants (vs. between two different groups), we
also re-analyzed the data of experiment 1. We compared
performances (% choices) for the fractals that were ‘‘over-
observed’’ (observed more than 4 times) compared to the fractals
that were ‘‘under-observed’’ (less than 4 times). We tested whether
optimists and pessimists differed in their ‘‘under-observed’’ and
‘‘over-observed’’ biases using two sample t-tests. Consistent with
our hypothesis, we found that the differences in performances
between optimists and pessimists was statistically significant for
Figure 1. a) Cartoon of the task: subjects are presented with a sequence of stimuli (here: O1, O2, O1) followed by a decision screen
(D1). Here the subject needs to choose between the yellow fractal and the square for which the reward probability is given by the number of blue
dots (6 dots, indicating a probability of 60%). Inset: Example of a longer sequence of interleaved observation screens and decision screens. b)
Performance of the subjects (% trials in which they chose the fractal stimulus) as a function of the difference between the observed reward rate of the
fractal being considered and the reward probability of the square. Compared to pessimistic people (red, LOT-R#mean LOT-R), optimistic people
(blue, LOT-R.mean LOT-R) tend to overestimate the probability of reward associated with the uncertain fractal stimulus. Errors bars denote standard
deviation. c) Correlation between subjects’ LOT-R scores and the mean of their prior distribution p(c) that the fractal stimulus will lead to a reward
(r = 0.438, p = 0.001). d) Examples of the prior distributions that were extracted for subjects 10 (pessimistic, LOT-R = 3) and 11 (optimistic, LOT-R = 22)
based on their task performance.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003605.g001
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‘‘under-observed’’ fractals (p,0.01), but not for the ‘‘over-
observed’’ ones (p = 0.135). We used a two-sample, one-tailed t-
test to test if one effect is significantly greater than the other, and
found that this was the case (p = 0.0017).
Punishment avoidance experiment
We finally asked whether optimism could also predict prior
beliefs about the likelihood of losses, by repeating the experiment
with punishments (i.e. losses of points) rather than rewards. The
experimental procedure was the same as in Experiment 1, except
for the fact that, here, both the CS and the square stimuli were
associated with a probability of punishment (instead of reward),
depicted by a cartoon of a sad face. Subjects were now asked to
estimate the probability of punishment ci associated with the CS
and to avoid punishment when choosing between the CS and the
square stimulus.
A total of 51 subjects (29 males and 22 females, age range: 17–
38 years old) participated in this version of the experiment. Four
subjects (1 female and 3 males) were post-hoc excluded from
further analysis, because they did not achieve a 50% performance.
We found that under those conditions, optimistic and pessimistic
subjects had similar performances (Figure 3). Moreover, subjects’
prior mean did not correlate with the LOT-R score (r = 0.049,
p = 0.74; significantly different from that of experiment 1, Fisher’s
Z= 2.05, p= 0.04 and achieved power: 12b=0.86). The RL
models were not as good at explaining the data as the Bayesian
model (in terms of their BIC values, see Methods) and the extracted
model parameters didn’t differ between groups (Table 2 and 3).
Discussion
In conclusion, trait optimism as measured by the LOT-R
questionnaire is found to correlate with performance biases in a
simple Pavlovian conditioning task: optimistic subjects over-
estimate the probability of reward associated with the uncertain
target. This bias affects the estimation of future rewards but not of
future losses in our task. It conforms to Bayesian principles of
optimal inference and disappears when the level of uncertainty
decreases.
Our findings are consistent with intuition about the nature of
optimism in humans, as well as evidence that optimistic people are
more likely than pessimists to have positive gambling expectations
[17]. Interestingly in our study the observed estimation biases
concern future outcomes for neutral stimuli (the fractal shapes). This
can be contrasted with studies looking at unrealistic optimism,
which concern self-beliefs. Unrealistic optimism has been defined
as the ‘‘favorable difference between the risk estimate a person
makes for him or herself and the risk estimate suggested by a relevant
objective standard’’ [18]. Compared to such studies, our findings
differ in two ways. First, unrealistic optimism studies show that
participants are biased in their estimates of positive outcomes (such
as graduating from college, getting married, having a favorable
medical outcome) but even more so in their estimates of negative
outcomes (suffering from a disease, getting divorced etc.) [18]. In
our study, on the other hand, optimism corresponded to an
overestimation of the probability of positive outcomes (reward),
but not to an underestimation of the probability of negative
outcomes (punishment, experiment 3). This was unexpected at
first, since the LOT-R contains statements related to predictions of
both positive and negative events. One possible reason might be
that the salience of positive and negative outcomes may have
differed. Future studies will be needed to assess the generality of
the asymmetric effect of optimism, in particular by using more
salient negative reinforcers.
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Second, in our experiment, participants don’t seem to be biased
in the learning process itself. Optimists and pessimists differ in
their initial biases but not in how they accumulate new
information. Moreover, fitting the data with reinforcement models
showed that they learned similarly from positive prediction errors
(‘‘good news’’) and negative prediction errors (‘‘bad news’’).
Studies looking at updating of beliefs related to one’s personal
qualities or future life events [6–9], on the other hand, have
typically found that people are likely to discount new information
that is worse than their current beliefs, and as such appeared to be
‘‘non-Bayesian’’ learners. For example, Eil and Rao (2011) find
that participants tended to discard negative information (‘‘bad
news’’) when processing personal information regarding their IQ
or Beauty, whereas ‘‘good news’’ led to a much tighter adherence
to Bayesian updating of their beliefs [7]. Wisfall and Zafar (2011)
also conclude that college students in their study are not Bayesian
updaters when they have to form and update their beliefs about
their future earnings [9]. Similarly, in a task where participants
have to estimate the likelihood of a negative future life event, such
as divorce or cancer, Sharot et al (2011) show that participants
updated their beliefs more in response to information that was
better than expected compared to information that was worse [6].
There are many important differences between the current
paradigm and those studies, which makes the comparison difficult.
As stated above, a crucial difference is whether the quantity to be
estimated concerns the self or a neutral stimulus. This can lead to
large differences in motivation in the learning process: when
information is personally relevant, participants have a motive to
disregard negative information so that they can keep a rosy view of
the future. In our task, on the other hand, there is no intrinsic
advantage of keeping a biased estimate for the probability of
rewards associated with the fractals. Consistent with this idea, Eil
and Rao found that participants conformed Bayesian rationality in
their control (neutral) condition [7]. Mobius et al. provide a
theoretical framework that can possibly unify all these results: they
suggest that the updating asymmetry itself can be explained by
Bayesian principles in a model where agents derive utility from
their beliefs. This model includes the fact that believing that one
Figure 2. Reduced uncertainty experiment. a) Performance of the subjects (percentage of trials in which they chose the fractal stimulus) as a
function of the difference between the observed reward rate of the fractal being considered and the reward probability of the square. Pessimistic
(red, LOT-R#mean LOT-R) and optimistic people (blue, LOT-R.mean LOT-R) behave similarly. Errors bars denote standard deviation. b) Correlation
between subjects’ LOT-R scores and the mean of their prior distribution p(c) that the fractal stimulus will lead to a reward (r = 0.009, p = 0.95).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003605.g002
Table 2. Best-fitting parameters for the Bayesian model summarized per experiment and averaged for the entire group of subjects
and per subgroup (optimists and pessimists).
Group LOT-R Bayesian Model Sig.
a/(a+b) c
Experiment 1 Mean 14.70 (4.42) 0.42 (0.23) 7.88 (3.93)
Optimists (N=31) 17.30 (2.36) 0.47 (0.21) 8.01 (4.09) */*/n.s
Pessimists (N=20) 10.60 (3.69) 0.33 (0.25) 7.75 (3.78) */*/n.s
Experiment 2 Mean 15.65 (4.27) 0.49 (0.37) 4.03 (1.64)
Optimists (N=26) 18.96 (2.30) 0.50 (0.40) 3.82 (1.69) */n.s./n.s
Pessimists (N=21) 12.33 (4.02) 0.48 (0.38) 4.18 (1.61) */n.s./n.s
Experiment 3 Mean 15.44 (3.60) 0.56 (0.32) 6.71 (5.30)
Optimists (N=30) 18.32 (3.13) 0.56 (0.37) 6.76 (4.62) */n.s./n.s
Pessimists (N=20) 12.55 (3.87) 0.55 (0.31) 6.67 (5.40) */n.s./n.s
Each column presents the mean value, with the standard deviation between brackets. Significance of the differences is shown on the right of the table: an asterisk in the
corresponding column (left to right: LOT-R; a/(a+b) which defines where the prior is centered; c is the softmax decision parameter) indicates a p value less than 0.05 for
a t-test between optimists and pessimists.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003605.t002
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has a higher than average IQ, for example, even if it is untrue, has
an intrinsically ‘‘rewarding’’ value, in that it helps self-confidence
[8].
Other differences in experimental design between these studies
and ours are worth mentioning. In [6], for example, the
information given about the occurrence probability (e.g. ‘‘actual
likelihood cancer 30%’’) is explicit, high-level, provided only once
and open to interpretation (i.e. participants can decide whether
this should apply to them or not) whereas our study involves actual
experienced outcomes that have to be integrated over time for the
occurrence probability to be estimated. Despite these differences,
our results combined with those mentioned above suggest that that
there might be at least two distinct computational expressions of
optimism: one, corresponding to very general initial biases for
simple associations of stimuli and outcomes that can be overcome
by learning; and a second one directly affecting the learning
process in the domain of personally relevant beliefs with strong
emotional content (such as one’s qualities, future health or
success). It will be important in the future to clarify the boundaries
between these domains.
The experimental paradigm opens the door to a number of
investigations. For example, our experimental paradigm offers new
routes to the differentiation between optimism and pessimism, and
optimism and hope, which are sometimes believed to be different
constructs [19,20]. There is a documented link between depression
and (the lack of) unrealistic optimism [21,22]. For example, Strunk
et al investigated how participants estimate the likelihood of
positive and negative future life events and found that depressed
individuals exhibit a pessimistic bias by over-estimating the
likelihood of negative future events [22]. It will be important to
see how participants with depressive symptoms perform in our
task. It will also be interesting to examine the impact of
pharmacological manipulations particularly of dopamine or
serotonin [23].
Finally, optimistic biases have also been reported in animals and
it has been proposed that those biases could be used as an
indicator of affective state [24]. For example, Harding et al have
found that rats can display optimistic or pessimistic biases when
interpreting ambiguous stimuli. Moreover, such biases correlated
with the quality of their housing (unpredictable – which induces
symptoms of a mild depression-like state – or predictable) [25]. In
this context, it is interesting that our paradigm can also be adapted
for use with animals. It would be very interesting to investigate the
relation between cognitive biases observed in such situations of
ambiguity with the ones we report. Adapting our paradigm for use
with animals will also allows the translational investigation of the
underlying neural substrate [26].
Methods
1. Ethics statement
All participants gave informed written consent and the
University of Edinburgh Ethics Committee approved the methods
used in this study, which was conducted in accordance with the
principles expressed in the Declaration of Helsinki.
2. Behavioral task
All experiments took place at the Perception lab at the University
of Edinburgh. 51 naive subjects took part in each experiment and
were recruited mainly among students of the University of
Edinburgh. First, subjects were asked to sign a consent form and
to fill in the questionnaires. Then, a short trial version of the
behavioral task was presented, during which verbal and text
instructions were given. Once subjects had confirmed that they
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were comfortable with the task, they were presented with the full
version of the experiment.
Visual stimuli were generated using the Matlab programming language
and displayed using Psychophysics Toolbox [27;28]. Participants viewed
the display in a darkened room on a 200monitor at a viewing distance of
approx. 100 cm. Stimulus sizes on the screen were 868 cm and 565 cm
for fractals and chests respectively.
The experiment contained two types of screens (Figure 1a): i) a
series of observation screens which subjects had to passively observe.
On each of these screens a fractal stimulus (or conditioned
stimulus, CS) was shown to be associated with a binary reward (the
presentation of the fractal was followed after 700 ms. by the
presentation of a full treasure chest) or not (the fractal led to an
empty chest); intermixed with ii) 60 decision screens, where the
subject was asked to choose between a fractal stimulus that he
had observed before and a blue square, by clicking on it with
the mouse. The task of the subjects was to maximize reward
gain.
More precisely, there were 60 different fractal stimuli in total.
They were generated using Matlab code available from the
C.I.R.A.M. Research center in Applied Mathematics at the
University of Bologna. The probability ci for each fractal CS to
lead to a reward was drawn randomly between 0 and 1 at the start
of the experiment and kept unknown to the subject. As described
above, CSs were then shown in random sequences of observation
and decision screens. More precisely, in the main experiment,
each CS was assigned to a group of 5 fractals and those were
presented in randomly interleaved observation screens before they
were shown in decision screens (Figure 1a – inset). In the main
experiment, each CS was observed on average 4 times before it
appeared on a decision screen (the exact number was drawn
from a Poisson distribution with mean 4 and truncated to be
greater than 2). Each CS was involved in only one decision
screen. On each decision screen, the reward probability of the
square stimulus was drawn randomly from 0 and 1 (binned with
steps of 0.1). This probability was explicitly indicated to the
subjects, and depicted as a proportion of full circles out of a set of
10 circles (Figure 1a). The side on which the CS appeared in the
decision screen was chosen randomly on each trial. Decision
screens were displayed until the subject chose one stimulus by
clicking on the mouse. The behavioral experiment lasted about
30 minutes.
Feedback was not given after each decision screen but each
subject was given a final score at the end of the experiment. Due to
funding changes, the first 42 subjects of experiment 1 were unpaid
but participated in a draw with a £20 voucher prize, while subjects
of experiment 2 and 3 and the last 11 subjects in the main
experiment were paid £6 for participation (unrelated to their
performance at the task). No significant differences were found
between paid and unpaid participants’ performances.
3. Bayesian model
We assumed that subjects behave as Bayesian observers, and
estimated the probability of reward, denoted ci, associated with a
given fractal i by computing the posterior distribution p(ci |Di),
using Bayes rule:
Figure 3. Punishment avoidance experiment. a) Cartoon of the task. The CS can either lead to a punishment (indicated by a sad face) or
nothing. b) Performance of the subjects (percentage of trials in which they chose the fractal stimulus) as a function of the difference between the
observed reward rate of the fractal being considered and the reward probability of the square. Pessimistic (red, LOT-R#mean LOT-R) and optimistic
people (blue, LOT-R.mean LOT-R) behave similarly. c) Correlation between subjects’ LOT-R scores and the mean of their prior distribution p(c) that
the fractal stimulus will lead to a reward (r =20.049; p = 0.74).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003605.g003
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p(ci D i)~
p(Di Dci)p(ci)
p(Di)
ð1Þ
where Di denotes the series of observations related to fractal i
(series of rewards observed, or not, on all observed trials) and p(ci)
denotes the subject’s prior belief that CS i will be associated with a
reward.
We further assumed that subjects formed their decision by
extracting the mean of this posterior distribution so as to obtain an
estimate cˆi of ci:
c^i~
ð1
0
cip ci Dijð Þdci ð2Þ
We modeled the prior distribution p(ci) using a beta distribution,
which is the conjugate prior of the binomial distribution. This
prior has the form:
p(ci)~
C(azb)
C(a)zC(b)
ci
a{1(1{ci)
b{1 ð3Þ
where C denotes the gamma function and parameters a and b
control the shape of the prior and are assumed to be the same for
all CSs. A prior centered on values lower than chance was
considered as a ‘pessimistic prior’, whereas a prior centered on
values greater than chance was considered as an ‘optimistic prior’
in the experiment (Fig. 1d). Under this model, it can be shown
that, for each fractal, the posterior mean cˆi is:
c^i~
niza
Nizazb
ð4Þ
where Ni is the number of time fractal i was shown, and ni the number of
times it was associated with a reward in the observation screens.
We assumed that subjects’ decision results from a ‘softmax’
comparison between their estimate cˆi of the probability that
the CS should lead to a reward with the probability bi (explicitly
given) that the square stimulus should lead to a reward on trial t.
Subjects would then choose the CS with probability p(choose
fractal):
p(choose fractal)~
exp(cc^i)
exp(cc^i)zexp(cbi)
ð5Þ
where parameter c controls how closely the subjects’ responses follow the
internal estimates and is assumed to be fixed during the whole session.
Under this decision-making model, each subject was thus described by 3
free parameters: a, b and c. These parameters were estimated for each
subject based on their task performances, usingMaximum Likelihood and
numerical optimization methods in Matlab (fmincon).
4. Reinforcement learning models
We also fitted various reinforcement learning (RL) models to
our data. Our idea was to assess whether RL models could capture
the differences in performance between optimists and pessimists in
experiment 1, and if so, to identify the parameters which would
explain those differences. We were particularly interested in
assessing whether optimists and pessimists would differ most in the
parameters governing value update as a function of the sign of the
prediction error or in those parameters setting the initial biases
(consistent with the alternative account of optimism as a prior
belief). We used a simple temporal-difference (TD) learning
algorithm. In these models, subjects learn a value V(si) for each CS
i, which is initialized at vo (identical for each CS) and then updated
after each observation of that CS, according to:
Vtz1(si)~Vt(si)ze(dt)dt ð6Þ
where dt = rt2Vt(si) denotes the prediction error, rt denotes the
binary reward, t represents the observation number, and the
learning rate e(dt) is set to hold either the same value (e+= e2) for
better-than-expected (i.e. dt.0) and worse-than-expected out-
comes (dt,0), or different values (e+?e2). The selection between
targets 1 and 2 is governed by a softmax action selection, with
additional parameter t.
p(choose fractal)~
exp tV Sið Þð Þ
exp tV Sið Þð Þzexp(tbi) ð7Þ
where bi corresponds to the reward probability of the colored
square. We first examined model RL2b which had 2 free learning
rates e+, e2 and free vo. We additionally examined simplified
versions of this model, which differed in the number of parameters
kept free in addition to t:
N RLe has only one learning rate e ( = e+= e2) as free
parameter, vo is set to 0.5;
N RL2 has 2 free learning rates e+, e2, vo is set to 0.5;
N RL2b has 2 free learning rates e+, e2, and free vo;
N RLb has only free v0, the learning rate e ( = e+= e2) is set to
0.1.
Each model was fitted to the data of each participant using
maximum-likelihood estimation. Table 2 and 3 present the group
averages of the best-fitting parameters for all the models.
We found that: i) only the models with free bias term vo
captured the difference in performance between optimists and
pessimists in experiment 1 (i.e. led to significantly different
parameters for optimists and pessimists); ii) in line with the
hypothesis that optimism functions as a initial bias, the bias vo
correlated with LOT-R scores in experiment 1 (significantly so for
RLb;: r = 0.541, p = 0.002); iii) the RL models were worse at fitting
the data than the Bayesian models, both in terms of log likelihood
and BIC values in all experiments (BIC for experiment 1:
RLe=71.83; RL2= 74.57; RL2b = 77.83; RLb = 75.53, Bayesian
model = 60.92; BIC for experiment 2: RLe=80.71; RL2= 83.36;
RL2b = 86.71;RLb= 81.16, Bayesian model = 71.38; BIC for
experiment 3: RLe=90.52; RL2= 93.88; RL2b= 97.49;
RLb= 90.14, Bayesian model = 83.12). We concluded that, in
our data, optimism is well described in terms of a positive
prior belief on the likelihood of reward and is not significantly
accompanied by selective updating during the learning
process.
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